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debtors. Thus, a party seeking substantive consolidation of a debtor with a non-debtor must meet
a heavier burden to show that the benefits outweigh the potential harms.
Discussion
I.

The Bankruptcy Court’s Equitable Powers Likely Extend to the Ability to
Substantively Consolidate Debtors and Non-Debtor Entities
Bankruptcy courts have been granted broad equitable powers.6 Courts have recognized

that these powers extend to the power to substantively consolidate a debtor with other debtor
entities.7 The courts may not, however, exercise their equitable powers in a manner that
contravenes other provisions of the Code.8 Courts have disagreed whether the substantive
consolidation of a debtor with a non-debtor would contravene the specifically laid out process for
involuntary bankruptcy. While it has been established that courts can substantively consolidate
multiple debtor entities, some courts have been reluctant to consolidate debtors with non-debtor
entities.9 However, it is likely that under at least some circumstances courts can and will
substantively consolidate a debtor with a non-debtor entity.
A. Substantive Consolidation in Relation to Involuntary Bankruptcy Provisions
Courts have disagreed whether substantive consolidation is a separate remedy from
involuntary bankruptcy or a tool that improperly bypasses involuntary bankruptcy procedure.
The issue with substantively consolidating a debtor with a non-debtor is that it can be viewed as
circumventing the requirements of involuntary bankruptcy. Courts have held that because there
are specific provisions laying out the process for involuntary bankruptcy, anything that cuts out
6

See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
See In re Giller, 962 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Owens Corning 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005); In re
Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
8
See Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014).
9
See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. The Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, 562 B.R. at
762–63 (holding that not only did the court lack the authority to substantively consolidate debtor with non-debtor
nonprofit, but also that even it did have the authority, it would decline to do so under the circumstances there).
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that process is circumventing the Code.10 Substantive consolidation of a debtor with a nondebtor is effectively forcing a non-debtor into bankruptcy without following the procedure laid
out in the Code.11
Further, courts have questioned whether they have jurisdiction over non-debtors and their
assets. For example in In re Circle Land & Cattle Corp., the court reasoned that to substantively
consolidate a non-debtor farmer with a debtor would improperly extend subject matter
jurisdiction over a non-debtor.12 Additionally, the court in In re Pearlman asserted that
“substantive consolidation is purely a bankruptcy remedy and does not extend to the assets and
affairs of a non-debtor.”13
According to In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, to substantively
consolidate a debtor with a nonprofit non-debtor entity would contravene section 303(a) because
the entities targeted for consolidation are usually exempt from involuntary bankruptcy.14 Section
303(a) prohibits forcing “a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation,” including eleemosynary15 institutions, into bankruptcy.16 Although involuntary
bankruptcy and substantive consolidation are considered distinct remedies, substantive
consolidation would effectively force a non-debtor nonprofit entity into bankruptcy against its
will.17 Under analogous circumstances, the court in In re Circle Land & Cattle Corp. held that it
could not substantively consolidate a debtor with a non-debtor farmer because farmers are
10

In re Pearlman, 462 B.R. 849, 851 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012).
See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. The Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, 562 B.R at
762–63.
12
213 B.R. at 876–77 (“Using § 105 to support an equitable order of substantive consolidation of a non-debtor with
a debtor is, in effect, taking jurisdiction over the non-debtor corporation without express statutory authority.”).
13
462 B.R. at 851.
14
553 B.R. 693, 703–04 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016), aff’d Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. The
Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, 562 B.R. 755 (D. Minn. 2016).
15
Eleemosynary institutions include churches, schools, and charitable organizations and foundations. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines eleemosynary as “[o]f, relating to, or assisted by charity; not-for-profit.” bars the involuntary
bankruptcy of “a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation.” (10th ed. 2014).
16
11 U.S.C. § 303(a).
17
See In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, 553 B.R. at 703–04.
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excepted from involuntary bankruptcy.18 Thus, it seems that courts are very reluctant to
substantively consolidate a debtor with a non-debtor, especially when the non-debtor falls into
the category of entities usually excepted from involuntary bankruptcy.
B. Substantive Consolidation as a Tool for Realizing a Debtor’s Total Assets
Despite some courts’ reluctance to consolidate debtors with non-debtors, many courts
have allowed the consolidation of a debtor with a non-debtor under certain circumstances.19 For
example, some courts have allowed substantive consolidation when non-debtors have been
determined to be alter egos of the debtor.20 In cases like these, substantive consolidation is
justified because the consolidation is not involuntarily dragging non-debtors into bankruptcy.
Rather, consolidation is recognizing that the debtor and non-debtor entities are not truly separate
and that the consolidation is necessary to reach the debtor’s true assets.
Courts that have allowed the consolidation of a debtor with non-debtors have reasoned
that because substantive consolidation and involuntary bankruptcy are distinct remedies,
substantive consolidation does not circumvent the involuntary bankruptcy process.21 Also, if a
party seeking substantive consolidation was required to meet all the provisions necessary for
involuntary bankruptcy, it would defeat the purpose of substantive consolidation.22 The
argument is that substantive consolidation is completely independent of involuntary bankruptcy
and is meant to be an alternate means to bring a non-debtor’s assets into a debtor’s estate.23
18

213 B.R. at 876.
See In re Logistics Info. Sys., Inc., 432 B.R. at 11 (“The majority of bankruptcy courts have found non-debtor
consolidation to be appropriate in some circumstances.”); In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 765.
20
In re United Stairs Corp., 176 B.R. 359, 371 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995) (holding that alter egos are not entitled to the
procedural safeguards of section 303).
21
See Matter of Munford, Inc., 115 B.R. 390, 397–98 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990).
22
See id. (“[T]he insolvency requirement of § 303 would subvert the entire purpose of substantive consolidation in
this case, which is to recover assets from a financially sound affiliated entity.”); see also In re S & G Fin. Servs. of
S. Florida, Inc., 451 B.R. 573, 582 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (“Compelling the Trustee to file an involuntary
bankruptcy petition under 11 U.S.C. § 303 would defeat the very purpose of substantive consolidation.”).
23
See Matter of Munford, Inc., 115 B.R. at 397–98.
19
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II.

The Standard for Substantively Consolidating a Debtor with a Non-Debtor is
Higher than for the Consolidation of Multiple Debtor Entities

Circuit courts have established different standards for deciding when substantive
consolidation is warranted. The D.C. Circuit has held that substantive consolidation of a debtor
is warranted when there is a “substantial identity” between the entities to be consolidated and
consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm or to realize some benefit.24 The Eighth Circuit,
drawing on Auto-Train, has held that when considering whether to substantively consolidate
debtors, courts should look at (1) the necessity of consolidation due to the interrelationship
among the debtors; (2) whether the benefits of consolidation outweigh the harm to creditors; and
(3) the prejudice resulting from not consolidating debtors.25 Although the test is meant to be
flexible and not mechanically applied, courts have often considered the difficulty of separating
the entities, the extent to which finances have been comingled, whether there are consolidated
financial statements, unity of interest and ownership, disregard for corporate formalities, and the
existence of parent and inter-corporate guarantees on loans.26
The Second Circuit and Third Circuit have both applied a similar test where a party seeking
to substantively consolidate debtors must show that the entities targeted to be consolidated
disregarded separateness so significantly that their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity
borders and treated them as one legal entity, or that the entities’ assets and liabilities are so
scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and hurts all creditors.27

24

See In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d at 276.
In re Giller, 962 F.2d at 799 (allowing for substantive consolidation when abuses of corporate form and
fraudulent conveyances made consolidation necessary).
26
In re Vecco Construction Industries, Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
27
See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211; In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d at 515; see also In re
Bonham, 229 F. 3d at 766 (adopting the Augie/Restivo test and applying it when consolidating a debtor and nondebtor).
25
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When deciding whether to consolidate a debtor with non-debtor entities, the Ninth Circuit
adopted the Augie/Restivo test.28 As with the substantive consolidation of a debtor with other
debtor entities, a party seeking to consolidate a debtor with non-debtor entities must show that
the finances are inextricably intertwined.29 Only when the movant can meet the pleading
requirement of showing that the debtor and non-debtor have an inseparable interest, substantive
consolidation may be granted.30
While substantive consolidation of a debtor and non-debtor is possible, the standard is more
stringent than for consolidating debtors.31 Courts have been reluctant to consolidate a debtor
with a non-debtor except under extraordinary circumstances.32 Additionally, courts that have
recognized the power to substantively consolidate a debtor and non-debtor have exercised that
power cautiously.33
Common throughout the tests is that substantive consolidation must be necessary. No single
factor can automatically trigger substantive consolidation. For example in Augie/Restivo, the
court said “Commingling, therefore, can justify substantive consolidation only where ‘the time
and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble them [is] so substantial as to threaten the

28

See In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 766.
See Matter of Munford, Inc., 115 B.R. at 397–99.
30
See id.
31
See In re Lease-a-Fleet, Inc., 141 B.R. 869, 872–73 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (“While consolidation of debtor and
non-debtor entities is possible, it should be undertaken only in the most unusual circumstances”).
32
See id. at 874 (“It is therefore not surprising to this court to find that placing an involuntary non-debtor
consolidate in such an unusual circumstance, betwixt and between the Bankruptcy Code, should be reserved for
unusual circumstances which might justify such a conceptually-strange measure.”).
33
See In Re Logistics Info. Sys., Inc., 432 B.R. at 12 (“While such power should be used cautiously, the great
weight of cases supports the authority of bankruptcy courts to order substantive consolidation of debtors and nondebtors.”); see also In re Howland, No. 16-5499, 2017 WL 24750 at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (“Substantive
consolidation is an ‘extreme’ measure, only to be used ‘sparingly,’ especially when consolidating a non-debtor
entity.”).
29
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realization of any net assets for all the creditors[.]’”34 Another important factor that every court
considers is potential harm to creditors. For example in Augie/Restivo, the Court held that
“substantive consolidation should be used only after it has been determined that all creditors will
benefit because untangling is either impossible or so costly as to consume the assets.”35 Further,
one court said that the courts should “ask are any creditors going to be hurt by this consolidation
and, if the answer to that is yes (or more properly, if the one seeking consolidation cannot prove
the opposite), consolidation should be denied in almost every case.”36
Conclusion
Meeting the standard to substantively consolidate a debtor and a non-debtor is difficult.
While some courts have been reluctant to substantively consolidate a debtor and a non-debtor
because it can be viewed as circumventing the involuntary bankruptcy process, the courts that
have allowed substantive consolidation of a debtor and non-debtor have applied a stricter
standard than when consolidating multiple debtors. First, it is generally more difficult to show
that a debtor and a non-debtor entity are so inextricably intertwined that consolidation is
necessary than it is for related debtor entities. Second, because all creditors must be equitably
treated, it is much harder to show that the creditors of the non-debtor entities will not be harmed.
Therefore, even when courts assert that they have the ability to substantively consolidate debtor
and non-debtor entities, they often decline to do so because of the demanding burden moving
parties face in showing that the entities are sufficiently intertwined and that no creditors will be
harmed.

34

In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d at 519
Id.
36
In re Circle Land & Cattle Corp., 213 B.R. at 875–76; see also In re Amco Ins., 444 F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2006)
(“This Court has stated that substantive consolidation affects the substantive rights of the parties and therefore is
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny”).
35
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